Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Face Presentation Attack Detection

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
Objectives

• Assess the robustness of face PAD models.


• Define **interpretability**-related properties of a robust face PAD model.



Experimental Assessment



Unseen-Attack



Findings and Conclusions


• Interpretability was explored to further **assess** the **robustness** of face PAD models. • We defined **desirable properties** for a face PAD model to fulfill that are **verifiable** through an

Introduction

- **Deep learning** algorithms are excelling in most of the artificial intelligence **fields**.
- Sometimes deep learning incredible performances are obtained by a focus in wrong/biased dataset-related **information** instead of domain significant information [1].
- An **evaluation** performed based on only the **traditional metrics** may be **misleading**.
- We propose the use of interpretability methods to further assess model robustness.

Methodology

Figure 2:Explanations for correctly classified attack samples (TP) in the One-Attack (2nd column) or Unseen-Attack (3rd column) frameworks. Each row corresponds to one specific type of attack, top to bottom: #1, #4, and #7.



- **interpretability** analysis of the models.
- This **interpretability** evaluation can only be done qualitatively, therefore, lacking objectivity.
- Future work will focus on finding ways of **quantifying** the information obtained with the interpretability analysis.

References

- [1] Sebastian Lapuschkin, Alexander Binder, Grégoire Montavon, Klaus-Robert Muller, and Wojciech Samek. Analyzing classifiers: Fisher vectors and deep neural networks.
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• A **PAD** method receives as input a biometric trait measurement and returns as output a **prediction**: living individual (**bona fide**) or spoof attempt to intrude the system (*attack*).





Figure 1:Architecture of the implemented PAD model.

• With regards to the interpretability method, we selected **Grad-CAM** [2], as it has the flexibility to generate explanations for any layer of the network, and also allow us to obtain class-specific explanations.



pages 2912–2920, 2016.

[2] Ramprasaath R Selvaraju, Michael Cogswell, Abhishek Das, Ramakrishna Vedantam, Devi Parikh, and Dhruv Batra. Grad-cam: Visual explanations from deep networks via gradient-based localization. In Proceedings of the IEEE international conference on computer vision, pages 618-626, 2017.

[3] Haoliang Li, Wen Li, Hong Cao, Shiqi Wang, Feiyue Huang, and Alex C Kot. Unsupervised domain adaptation for face anti-spoofing. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 13(7):1794–1809, 2018.

[4] Ana F Sequeira, Wilson Silva, João Ribeiro Pinto, Tiago Gonçalves, and Jaime S Cardoso.


Interpretable biometrics: Should we rethink how presentation attack detection is evaluated?

In 2020 8th International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF), pages 1-6. IEEE, 2020.

• The **experiments** were performed with the **ROSE-Youtu Face Liveness Detection** Dataset |3|.

Table 1:Characteristics of the presentation attack instruments in the ROSE Youtu dataset [3].

Attack	Type of presentation attack instruments	N.I.
_	Genuine (bona fide)	2794
#1	Still printed paper	1136
#2	Quivering printed paper	1188
#3	Video of a Lenovo LCD display	923
#4	Video of a Mac LCD display	1113
#5	Paper mask without cropping	1194
#6	Paper mask with two eyes and mouth cropped out	608
#7	Paper mask with the upper part cut in the middle	1162



Desirable Properties

- Explanations for the same sample should be similar whether or not it is **seen** during **training** (data swap).
- Explanations for the same sample should be similar whether or not the model is trained to detect that specific attack (One-Attack vs. Unseen-Attack).

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